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General information |
Course unit name: Mathematics
Course unit code: 360890
Academic year: 2025-2026
Coordinator: Emili Valdero Mora
Department: Department of Economic, Financial and Actuarial Mathematics
Credits: 6
Single program: S
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Estimated learning time |
Total number of hours 150 |
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Face-to-face and/or online activities |
60 |
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- Lecture with practical component |
Face-to-face |
30 |
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- Problem-solving class |
Face-to-face |
30 |
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Supervised project |
40 |
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Independent learning |
50 |
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Learning objectives |
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Referring to knowledge The course in Mathematics on the Sociology degree aims to equip students with the tools needed to understand the quantitative instruments used in sociological research and to design and organise information effectively. |
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Teaching blocks |
1. Markov Chains
* This block introduces the concept of a stochastic process and of a Markov chain as tools for representing the different states of a system and the probabilities of transition between them. It examines the existence of absorbing states and long-run equilibrium.
1.1. Basic concepts: probability, probabilistic vectors, stochastic processes, system states, transition matrices
1.2. The concept of a Markov chain
1.3. State transition diagrams
1.4. Absorbing and non-absorbing states
1.5. Long-run equilibrium in a Markov chain
2. Game Theory
* Game theory concerns the study of multi-agent decision problems, including both situations in which explicit agreements between agents or players are possible (cooperative games) and those resolved through individual decision-making without the possibility of establishing binding agreements (non-cooperative games).
This block explains how to formalise real situations as cooperative or non-cooperative games, depending on the context. Students learn to identify the players, the strategies available, the possibilities for cooperation and coalition formation, and the potential outcomes of the interaction. To infer predictable behaviour, we develop the concept of Nash equilibrium for non-cooperative games and the Shapley value for cooperative games. The stability of coalitions that may emerge is also analysed.
2.1. Cooperative Games
2.1.1 Fundamental concepts. The characteristic function
2.1.2 Efficient distributions between players. Stability of a coalition
2.1.3 Fully and partially cooperative games
2.1.4 Stability of coalitions
2.1.5 Resolving a cooperative game: the Shapley value
2.2. Introduction to game theory
2.2.1 Game concepts
2.2.2 Elements of a game
2.2.3 Types of games: cooperative and non-cooperative
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Official assessment of learning outcomes |
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Continuous assessment—the standard mode of evaluation—consists of two, in-person, written mid-term examinations and the submission of other activities completed outside the classroom.
Examination-based assessment Single assessment consists of a final examination, comprising theoretical and practical questions, held on the date set by the Academic Council. The final grade for the course corresponds to the mark obtained on this examination. |
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Reading and study resources |
Check availability in Cercabib
Book
MORROW, James. Game Theory for political scientists. Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University Press, cop. 1994
Catāleg UB
Versiķ en línia (1994)
GARDNER, Roy. Juegos para empresarios y economistas. Barcelona: Antoni Bosch, 1996
RAFELS, C. (coord.). Jocs cooperatius i aplicacions econòmiques. Barcelona : Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona, 1999
SÁNCHEZ-CUENCA, I. Teoría de juegos. 2a. ed. Madrid : Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 2009
| Concise, accessible manual with applications to sociology and political science. |
Catāleg UB
Versiķ en línia (2009)
HODGE, Jonathan K. ; KLIMA, Richard E. The Mathematics of voting and elections: a hands-on approach. Providence, R.I.: American Mathematical Society, 2005
TAYLOR, A.D. ; PACELLI, A.M. Mathematics and politics. strategy, voting, power and proof. 2nd ed.. [New York, N.Y.]: Springer, cop. 2008
ADILLON, R. ... [et al.]. Lliçons introductòries de matrius i sistemes d’equacions lineals. Barcelona : Professors del Dept. Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial. Universitat de Barcelona, 2001